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The 2009 South African national election has come and gone and was generally regarded as having been
a great success. Voter turnout was high and the event took place, virtually without exception, in an
orderly and calm manner. Despite this, there were numerous incidents of election-related violence in the
build-up to the elections, and a few in the immediate aftermath. The 2009 election therefore cannot be
described as having been violence free. That being the case, how should we understand election-related
violence in South Africa? Is political violence during election periods here to stay, and is it something that
we need to concern ourselves about in relation to future elections?
Since 1994, every national and local election day
in South Africa has proceeded in an orderly and
peaceful manner. There is no doubt that the
results of each of these elections broadly expressed
the will of the South African people. Nevertheless,
violence and intimidation continue to leave an
imprint on the outcome of our elections. This
article reflects on the violence in the lead-up to
the 2009 election against the background of
violence in previous elections. The article argues
that election violence will continue to be a threat
in future elections particularly if the election is
seen to have the potential to bring about
significant shifts in the political balance of power.   
VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE 2009 ELECTION 
During the latter part of 2008 and early 2009 a
number of clashes took place between supporters
of rival political parties. Several clashes were
reported between African National Congress
(ANC) and Congress of the People (COPE)
supporters in places like Duncan Village and Kou-
Kamma in the Eastern Cape, and in Verulam in
KwaZulu-Natal. In most of these cases ANC
supporters were accused of disrupting COPE
meetings. There was also a report that COPE
members had been attacked by ANC supporters in
Winterveld in the North West province, but this
was disputed by the ANC.1 On Saturday 31
January a confrontation between ANC and
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) members took place
at the funeral of an assassinated pro-ANC
traditional leader in the Nongoma area, while on
the following day buses transporting ANC
supporters to an election rally in the area were
blockaded. These were just two of a number of
incidents of political violence in the area on that
weekend. 
While media coverage indicates that violence
peaked early on in the build-up to the election, it
appears that it continued until late in the election
campaign.2 In a report for the month of March the
Election Monitoring Network (EMN)3 reported
that 'political parties continued to be involved in
intolerant behaviour' which included disrupting
 
each other's meetings, defacing posters, and, in
some cases, physical violence. The report indicates
that, during March, there were six cases of these
kinds of political intolerance in the Northern
Cape, four in the Eastern Cape, and seven in
KwaZulu-Natal. The EMN report also refers to
instances where local disputes became politicised
and consequently more acrimonious. For instance,
in one incident in Khayelitsha, 'community
patrollers requested a shebeen owner to close his
shebeen because it was operating beyond the
accepted times. The shebeen patrons then accused
the patrollers of being supporters of a rival
political party. This then led to an altercation in
which a councillor took part in the demolition of
the patroller's houses and evicted members of the
rival party in this area'.4
In one clash between party supporters at Walter
Sisulu University in the Eastern Cape, a student
was killed. People were also injured in some of the
other clashes around the country. The most
serious violence, however, did not manifest during
clashes between party supporters, but in the
murder and attempted murder of individual
political party leaders or supporters, usually by
anonymous gunmen. These included the murder
of ANC Youth League KZN chairperson,
Sthembiso Cele, 27, who was shot on 2 January in
Umgababa on the KwaZulu-Natal south coast, and
the murder of high profile ANC member, Inkosi
Mbongeleni Zondi, in Durban's Umlazi township
on 29 January. As indicated above, Zondi's funeral
in Nongoma on 31 January was the site of a
confrontation between IFP and ANC members.
On the same weekend there were other serious
incidents in the area, including an attempt on the
life of an ANC organiser and an attack on a car in
which an ANC MP and others were travelling,
with three of those in the car injured in the
attack.5
A few weeks later, in mid-February, IFP organiser
Ntokozo Malibongwe Zondi was gunned down in
his car near Esikhawini. The EMN report indicates
that there were four cases of murder, apparently
related to the election, in March 2009 in
Nongoma, Esikhawini, Gingindlovu (Eshowe) and
Molweni, with a further two people being shot in
Nongoma. On the night of the election COPE
leader Gerald Yona was killed after he, his wife and
children were attacked by three men at their home
in Motherwell in the Eastern Cape. Five days after
the election, on 27 April, members of the ANC
who were travelling in a motorcade and had
stopped to fix a broken tyre were shot at in
KwaZulu-Natal. Simisele Hlongwane was killed in
the incident, with police reporting that six others
had been injured. Other serious incidents of
violence included the burning down of houses of
COPE supporters in Parys in the Free State.6
ELECTION, POLITICAL AND
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
When the supporters of political parties openly
clash with each other in the build-up to elections,
it usually seems reasonable to label the violence as
political and as election-related. 
But in the case of apparently premeditated
murders, attacks and acts of arson, committed by
anonymous perpetrators, it is not so straight-
forward. In some cases incidents perceived to be
election-related might be purely criminal, but
labelled as political by media reports, based purely
on the coincidence that the person was a political
leader who was killed close to election time.
Killings or attacks might also be related to the
election or to political rivalry, but be linked to
internal party rivalry as opposed to inter-party
conflict. Even where acts of violence are clearly
election-related, it does not always follow that they
are purely politically motivated. A murder may be
organised by political opponents but have little to
do with the election. For instance, the killing of
ANC Mpumalanga local councillor Jimmy Mohlala
on 4 January was widely believed to be linked to
the fact that he had 'blown the whistle' on alleged
corruption in a 2010 construction project.7 As this
case also suggests, there are instances in which
criminal and political motives may intersect so that
'political violence' and 'criminal violence' cannot be
understood as mutually exclusive categories.8
If a politician is killed at election time it is
therefore not necessarily the case that the killing is
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political, and even where it is political, not
necessarily election-related. There is therefore a
need for some caution to be exercised in analysing
the topic of 'election-related violence'. It is
probably appropriate to acknowledge that many of
these kinds of acts are 'presumed election-related
violence' but that there is an element of
uncertainty. Certainly some of the murders took
place in circumstances that strongly suggest a
political motive. It may be reasonable to assume
that most, and possibly all, of the killings discussed
here were election-related. But at least until
someone is convicted for the killing, it is necessary
to acknowledge that an element of uncertainty as
to the exact motive remains in relation to each
one.
VIOLENCE AND PAST ELECTIONS 
The levels of violence in the build-up to the 2009
election were of course much lower than those
experienced in the build-up to South Africa's first
democratic election on 27 April 1994. This took
place in the immediate aftermath of the bloodiest
period in recent South African history. In 1993, 
3 794 people were killed in political violence, and
this violence continued into 1994. This included
the March 2004 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
invasion of the then Bophuthatswana capital,
Mafeking, an event marked by the random killing
of black civilians. 
The most violent and persistent clashes, however,
involved the ANC and IFP. These mainly took
place in what is now KwaZulu-Natal, as well as the
East Rand, which was also a major focal point of
ANC-IFP conflict. The violence was fuelled by
'Third Force' elements of the South African
security establishment who provided arms and
military training to elements within the IFP. On 
28 March 1994, 53 people were killed, many in the
Johannesburg city centre, in a day of confrontation
between the IFP and ANC. The build-up to
election day continued in an atmosphere of
enormous political tension and uncertainty. This
was finally defused on 19 April, eight days before
the election, when the IFP announced that it
would participate in the election. 
The entry of the IFP into the election race allowed
the election to go ahead in an atmosphere of
relative normality.  One thing that is often glossed
over is that large parts of KwaZulu-Natal remained
effective no-go areas right up to election day.
ANC-IFP conflict continued well beyond that
point. Though there was a decline in political
violence relative to the pre-election period, large
numbers of deaths from political violence
continued to be recorded, most of them in
KwaZulu-Natal.10 Fortunately a peace process was
established to bring an end to political violence in
the province,11 and the level of political violence
was steadily reduced. But as shown by this year's
election, violence continues to be a feature of
political conflict between the ANC and IFP to this
day.    
By comparison with 1994, the June 1999 election
was much more peaceful. Again, the most
prominent flashpoint for political violence was
KwaZulu-Natal, but in a reflection of the impact of
the peace process the build-up to the election was
not marred by large-scale ANC-IFP conflict. In so
far as violence was a feature of the pre-election
period the most prominent incidents involved
conflict between the ANC and a new political
party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM),
concentrated in the Richmond area in KwaZulu-
Natal. The violence started well before the
elections. In late 1998 South African National
Defence Force (SANDF) troops were deployed to
the area and a specialised unit of detectives and
prosecutors was established to investigate political
violence, in a move that was intended to put an
end to the conflict.12
Richmond however exploded into violence again
in January 1999 when local strongman and former
ANC leader, Sifiso Nkabinde, who had defected to
the UDM, was gunned down. The following day
11 more people in a nearby village were killed
after gunmen attacked homesteads believed to
belong to ANC supporters. On the same weekend
gunmen in the nearby Ndaleni area attacked a
convoy of ANC vehicles.13 Despite several other
incidents of violence and a continuing problem of
intimidation, no violence anywhere near this scale
was reported in KwaZulu-Natal after this point,
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though in early March 1999 violence between the
ANC and UDM in Nyanga and KTC in Cape
Town claimed five lives.14
In 2004 political violence barely featured, if at all,
in media coverage of the election. Two years later,
in the build-up to the local government election
on 1 March 2006, protests against the
incorporation of Khutsong into North West
province flared into violence in the town. By
election day, violence in the area had been largely
brought under control, though those protesting
against incorporation succeeded in preventing
voters from turning out, with only about 300 of
the 30 000 registered voters casting their votes.
Notwithstanding a strong police presence in
Khutsong on election day, many residents were
afraid that if they cast their ballots they would be
harmed, after the election, by opponents of
incorporation.15 Apart from Khutsong, violence
and intimidation did not feature in election
coverage.
CAUSES OF ELECTION VIOLENCE 
By comparison to the 2004 national and 2006 local
elections, this year's election was considerably
more violent. The reason for this appears quite
simple. The 2004 and 2006 elections were in many
ways merely a confirmation of the then existing
post-1994 status quo with Thabo Mbeki as then
ANC leader appearing to be firmly in control. By
contrast, the 2009 election was distinguished by
two major factors, which contributed to far greater
political dynamism and turbulence. 
The first of these factors was the emergence of
COPE as an opposition party. COPE was a
product of years of intense conflict within the
ANC and its leadership included a number of
former ANC leaders who had recently broken
away. The rivalry between the ANC and COPE has
been shaped by the deep bitterness and hostility
related to this conflict. In addition, COPE
attempted to position itself as a serious challenger
to the ANC's position of dominance in South
African politics and tried to compete with the
ANC in several wards where the ANC believed
that its control was virtually guaranteed.
The second factor, obviously closely related to the
first, was the dramatically changed political
situation in KwaZulu-Natal, related to the
symbolic impact of the election of Jacob Zuma as
national political leader of the ANC. Until the
2009 election the IFP held a position of relative
strength in the province. Although it no longer
controlled the provincial government, the number
of seats held by the IFP was not far short of the
number held by the ANC. However, political
loyalties in South Africa, not least of all in
KwaZulu-Natal, continue to be strongly shaped by
racial and ethnic identities. Zuma is a charismatic
politician who identifies himself with traditional
Zulu cultural practice and who ordinary people
appear to identify with. His ascendancy to
leadership of the ANC would have been seen by
many IFP supporters to threaten the still strong
power base of the IFP within the province. That
this was indeed the case was confirmed by the
2009 election results. Compared to 2004 the ANC
improved its provincial position by 16 percentage
points, winning 63 per cent of the vote in the
province. The IFP lost more than 14 percentage
points, ending with 22 per cent of the vote.   
While election-related violence can be analysed in
terms of national and provincial level power
struggles between the key political parties, it
should however be clarified that the evidence
suggests that the violence that did take place
cannot be linked to the senior leaders of the
political parties, whether at national or provincial
level. While rivalry between political parties,
particularly in the early days of the campaign, was
sometimes expressed in acrimonious language that
may have fed into some of the incidents of
violence, the violence that did take place cannot be
seen to have been orchestrated by senior party
leaders. In so far as it was orchestrated the people
who would mainly be implicated would most likely
be leaders at local level. Furthermore, these local
leaders were often motivated by the concern to
ensure access to resources, and service patronage
networks, rather than by questions of policy and
ideology. The overlap between 'political' and
'criminal' violence referred to above is therefore
likely to have been a factor in many cases. 
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Along with local level leaders, rank and file
supporters of political parties also seem to have
been a driver of violence in some areas. Along
with a culture of political intolerance, political
violence may therefore also be understood as a
manifestation of a broader culture of violence in
South Africa, in which violence is seen as a way
to address conflict and assert interests. 
The example of Nongoma 
One of the areas that features most prominently
in reports of ongoing political violence in South
Africa is the Nongoma area. Far from being
isolated incidents, the clashes and killings in the
area in the build-up to the 2009 election form
part of a continuing story of violent political
rivalry there. 
In mid-2000, for instance, the highly partisan
local police failed to intervene, and were even
implicated, in a series of politically related
killings in the area. The failures of the local SAPS
led to national intervention that included
amongst others the deployment of investigative
units from outside the area to investigate some of
the more high-profile murders. Although these
interventions gave rise to allegations of SAPS
favouritism towards the ANC, the investigations
resulted in the trial of six ANC members for the
killing of an IFP-aligned mayor, who had been
one of the key protagonists in the conflict.16
Another incident in the area took place in
October 2004 when a crowd of IFP supporters
disrupted an imbizo that was to have been
addressed by ANC MECs. 
Notwithstanding the possibility that ANC
members have been involved in acts of violence
in the area, the key driver of violence appears to
be the fact that the area, which borders on
Ulundi where the IFP headquarters are located, is
part of the IFP's political heartland. Attempts by
the ANC to mobilise political support in the area
are apparently seen, at least by some IFP
members and supporters, as threatening the
vested interests associated with local IFP political
dominance.17
Political intolerance 
The persistence of political violence in Nongoma
is one example that indicates that that there are
still no-go areas in South Africa, where people are
denied the right to freedom of association and
expression. But if in Nongoma the principal
victim of political intolerance appears to have
been the ANC this does not mean that the ANC
itself is always innocent of political intolerance.
For instance, ANC dominance in the Richmond
area in KwaZulu-Natal was established at the cost
of many lives, with Richmond and the Midlands
area also being a major IFP-ANC battleground in
the 1980s and early 1990s. The death of Nkabinde
in 1999 appears to have heralded the decisive
ascendancy of the ANC in the area.18 Examining
the issue of political intolerance in KwaZulu-
Natal should involve examining to what extent
such a problem exists in areas like Richmond, as
much as in areas like Nongoma.
Continuing the focus on KwaZulu-Natal, it is also
important to acknowledge that not only the IFP
and ANC may be affected by political intolerance
in the province. For instance, since ethnicity
continues to be a powerful factor in the province,
and both the ANC and IFP were able to mobilise
support on the basis of Zulu identity, it may have
seemed to other political parties, such as COPE,
that efforts to mobilise support in the province
would be largely wasted. But this 'strategic choice'
may have masked another factor – the fear of
those parties that active campaigning in
KwaZulu-Natal would provoke a violent
response.19 The absence of violence is therefore in
itself not sufficient to demonstrate that a culture
of political tolerance prevails. Such a culture can
only be said to fully exist if all political parties feel
free to canvas for support in all areas without any
fear of harm. 
CONCLUSION 
It would not be true to say that the 2009 election
was overshadowed by violence. The 2009 election,
like those before it, can in many ways be seen as
having been a great success. In this respect it
 
reflected the cumulative impact over time of
several factors, including the intensive work that
has been put into establishing peace in troubled
areas of South Africa, and the commitment of the
vast majority of politicians from all political
parties to work within the democratic framework.
In addition, the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) has played an important role
in motivating adherence to the Electoral Act and
its attached code of conduct.20 The SAPS also
appears to have contributed to the fact that
political violence is a relatively limited part of the
problem of violence in South Africa.21
Nevertheless, the 2009 election was not violence-
free. On one level the violence that did occur was
a manifestation of a residual problem of ongoing
political intolerance that is most strongly
concentrated in some areas. It is also the case that
political violence can be linked to local
competition over resources. The fact that
corruption remains a feature of political life in
South Africa implies that 'criminally related' acts
of political violence, such as political killings, will
continue to be a risk until there is a more robust
response to the problem of corruption. Finally,
the emergence of COPE and the ascendancy to
power of Jacob Zuma within the ANC,
threatened, or appeared to some to threaten, the
established political status quo.  
This raises the question of whether political
violence is to be expected in South Africa's next
general election in 2014. As is reflected by the
contrast between the 2004 and 2009 elections,
levels of political violence appear to be partly
related to whether the election holds out the
prospect of a shift in the balance of power
between rival political forces. The lesson of 2009
is that if there is the potential for such a shift,
South Africa will again face the prospect of
election-related violence in the build-up to 2014.
Despite the impression that violence and
intimidation were not a significant feature of the
2009 election, it still cannot be said that the rights
to free political activity have been fully
established in South Africa. Along with the
problem of corrupt local level politicians,
problems of political intolerance and no-go areas
need to be more decisively addressed in order to
consolidate the rights of South Africans to free
political activity.  
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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